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Dayside Inc. v. District Court, 119 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 48
(August 29, 2003)
MANDAMUS - CERTIORARI – MECHANIC’S LIENS
Summary
General contractor’s petition for writ of mandamus or certiorari against partial summary
judgment granted by the First Judicial District Court, State of Nevada, dismissing mechanic’s lien
against property owner.
Disposition/Outcome
Petition for writ of mandamus or certiorari denied. Petitioner did not demonstrate the district
court engaged in extra-jurisdictional acts or manifest abuse of discretion warranting such
extraordinary relief.
Factual and Procedural History
In May 1999, the Petitioner, Dayside Inc., (Dayside) and the real party in interest, Parkway
Manor, Inc. (Parkway), executed a preprinted form contract requiring Dayside to construct an
apartment building on Parkway’s real property for $9,165,226 in monthly installments. The parties
agreed, among other things, that Dayside would “not file a mechanic’s or materialman’s lien against
Parkway…on account of any work done, labor performed or materials furnished under this
Contract….” The parties expressly crossed out language imposing the waiver on subcontractors and
further wrote Dayside’s waiver of lien rights was valid “to the extent such waiver is in accordance
with Nevada law.”
Despite the lien-waiver provision, Dayside recorded a mechanic’s lien against Parkway and
joined a subcontractor already in litigation against Parkway after Parkway’s failure to pay “large
sums of money owed.” Dayside pled various contractual and tort claims against Parkway, including
foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien. Dayside alleged, among other things, such a waiver is void as
against public policy; there was insufficient consideration in support of the waiver; Parkway’s
nonpayment constituted a failure of consideration; and the waiver was entered involuntarily.
In June 2002, District Court Judge William Maddox granted partial summary judgment for
Parkway against Dayside and dismissed the lien, ruling the contract’s express lien-waiver provision
was clear and not contrary to Nevada law.
In December 2002, Dayside challenged the partial summary judgment and dismissal by
petitioning the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or certiorari. Nevada Supreme Court
Justices Robert Rose, Mark Gibbons, and William Maupin, in a per curiam decision, denied the
petition as the contractual waiver provisions did not violate public policy and the district court did not
abuse its discretion.
Discussion
Writs of mandamus are available to compel the performance of an act arising from a duty
required by law of an office, trust, or station, or to remedy a manifest abuse of discretion.1 Writs of
certiorari serve to remedy jurisdictional/judicial excesses by an inferior tribunal.2 Both are
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See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.160; see also Round Hill Gen. Imp. Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 637 P.2d 534 (1981).
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.020(2).

extraordinary remedies and generally unavailable if the petitioner has adequate legal remedy
available.3 Despite the availability of Dayside to appeal any final judgment, including the partial
summary judgment, because this petition raises an issue of first impression on an important issue of
law and public policy (the waiver of statutory protections for materialmen and laborers), the court
shall exercise its discretion and invoke its original jurisdiction to consider issuing a writ of mandamus
or certiorari to clarify the law and better serve public policy.4
Nevada’s legislative enactments are silent as to whether waivers of statutory rights to
mechanic’s liens are against public policy.5 It is well settled in some states that clear and
unambiguous contractual waivers of rights to mechanic’s liens are valid and binding.6 Some state
legislatures have declared a lien waiver as against public policy,7 whereas other states expressly
permit such waivers.8 The Nevada Supreme Court found that, absent a prohibitive legislative
proclamation, waivers of mechanic’s lien rights are not contrary to public policy.
As to Dayside’s failure of consideration argument, the court held that Parkway’s failure to
pay had no effect on the lien-waiver provision. Once waived, the contractor is limited to normal
common-law remedies such as breach of contract for failure to pay.9 Inadequate payment is an event
anticipated by the contract, rather than a failure of consideration.
The court rejected Dayside’s contention that there was inadequate consideration to support
the waiver clause in the first place. The court determined the mutual promises and negotiations of
Dayside to build and Parkway to pay for the construction were sufficient consideration in support of
the contract10 and the waiver provision was a bargained for part of that contract.11
The court did not reach to Dayside’s contention the lien rights were waived involuntarily
because the risks were “unknown, unquantified and…potentially the price of the entire job.” Because
Dayside did not make this argument to the district court, the Supreme Court had no evidentiary record
to determine whether the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily.
Conclusion
Dayside did not demonstrate the extraordinary relief requested is warranted. The district
court did not engage in an extra-jurisdictional act or a manifest abuse of its discretion in granting
summary judgment dismissing the lien. Accordingly, Dayside’s petition for a writ of mandamus or
certiorari is denied.
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